2009/1 Európa és Amerika viszonya Franciaország Jungbert Ádám LATIN-AMERIKA amerikai amerikai államok szervezet belgium bevándorlás egyensúly fegyverzetkorlátozás gyakorlat gáz hamasz migrations novák adám német oroszország simonyi szerbia

Policy Brief  2010/2

Erzsébet N. Rózsa

There is an ongoing debate as to the existence of the Arab world as such. While realities increasingly demonstrate that the Arab world in the Cold War sense does not exist any longer, and that they are independent countries pursuing their own foreign policy interests, joint all-Arab institutions (e.g. the Arab League) and initiatives (e.g. the Arab Free Trade Area) still exist, not to mention the still powerful rhetoric of the Arab unity, Arab homeland etc.
      It is a common notion, held mostly by the former socialist new EU member states that the democratic transition in Central Europe of 1989-1990 may serve as an example and may offer useful experience to the states in the Middle East, where-as is also widely agreed-regimes are mostly authoritarian and where democratisation is lagging behind.
      The Middle East, but especially the Arab world, is under pressure to democratise from three different sources:

     - from the outside, from the United States, most emphatically under the two George W. Bush administrations: President Bush launched the Greater Middle East initiative, the aim of which was to democratise the region from Morocco to Indonesia (i.e. the Islamic world) in order to avoid any threat that might emanate from non-democratic states, partly under the notion that democracies do not fight each other;
     - from the European Union, which within the institutional frameworks of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) and the European Neighbourhood Policy tries to pursue cooperation exerting European normative power to the region, one of the main underlying concepts of which is democratisation;
     - from the inside, encouraged by the American and European drive at democratisation by some or several, influential or less influential, domestic political groups, parties and organisations-to a varying degree in each Middle Eastern state.

     - In comparison, it can be stated that Central European states were exposed to the same pressures: democratisation was a precondition to both NATO and EU membership, and there was an urge from within as well.
      It should be emphasised that Central European states are also very different: they do not make up a homogenous unit. They have different pasts and their present status also offers a great variety: while there are states with a thousand-year-long statehood (e.g. Hungary), others had their independent statehood interrupted (e.g. Poland) and others did not even have an independent statehood of their own before the regime changes (e.g. Slovakia). The regime change introduced democracy and democratic institutions were established simultaneously. Democracy had not been unknown to Central Europe-most of the new EU member states had throughout their history struggled to be acknowledged as part of Europe and had their own share in European mainstream developments, including the democratic exercise-and during the socialist period these states were "people's democracies" reflecting this experience. Still the pressure was very high on them to transform according to the Western norms of democratisation. This, however, in Central Europe was welcomed by most layers of the society as a return to the "normal state of affairs" and was not seen as something pressed on them from the outside.
      The regime change and the transition that followed, however, had a profound impact on the Central European states' foreign policy and economic relations established during the preceding political and ideological framework. While it was understood that former connections should not be severed altogether, these were clearly downscaled under the new political and economic realities-even if this was meant as a temporary measure only.
      For Hungary historically and traditionally up to the post-Second World War period, the Middle East meant Ottoman Turkey (later the Republic of Turkey) and the Balkans. Hungary had no official direct contact with the Arab world before that. Political relations were started in the Soviet era following the Soviet pattern of foreign policy relations; i.e. relations were built with the friendly, socialist Arab states, while with the others relations were either limited (e.g. Hungary had an embassy in Morocco) or were non-existent altogether (e.g. in the Gulf). While politically these relations were mostly already defined, economically-the Arab world was the field where hard currency could be realised-and culturally there was some room for manoeuvre. Under the slogan of socialist internationalism Arab socialist party delegations, including high-ranking PLO officials, frequently visited Hungary. State media offered a wide and deep presentation of the Palestinian cause. Big Hungarian state-owned companies had huge economic projects in the friendly Arab states, especially in transport (railway and bus industry), electricity development, and construction and agricultural projects, in the framework of which many Hungarians worked in the Arab world for years. At the same time, many Arab students came to pursue their higher education and/or PhD studies in Hungary, some of whom settled in Hungary, some of whom took Hungarian wives.
      The 1920 Treaty of Trianon stripped Hungary of two thirds of its territory and left one third of Hungarians outside Hungary. Today, about three million ethnic Hungarians live in neighbouring states, most of them in Romania and Slovakia, who cannot be left disregarded by any Hungarian government. It should be noted, however, that the representation of their case mostly means the maintenance and support of their cultural rights and freedoms and does not imply any alteration of the existing borders.
      The regime change of 1989 and the democratic transition caused many changes and made Hungary turn relatively inward apart from the main political aim: reintegration into Europe. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Soviet Union itself, Hungary (along with other Central European states as well) had to reinvent its foreign policy, redefine its interests and re-establish relations with states accordingly. The new Hungarian foreign policy formulated three priorities, which have remained unchanged: integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, friendly relations with the country's neighbours, and the issue of the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries. There was practically not much energy left to maintain relations outside the Euro-Atlantic area, but the network of embassies was still maintained.
      While domestic political democratisation went rapidly and smoothly, the economic transition from a centrally planned economy to a liberal free market economy changed the underlying basis of foreign economic relations. The great state-owned companies disappeared and the smaller private companies had no power to conduct relations overseas. Economic relations with the Arab countries fell back drastically, and in some cases ceased to exist altogether. Especially hard hit were relations that had been politically oriented before.
      Hungary joined NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004. In the new framework Hungary has started to re-establish relations outside Europe, and so in the Arab world as well. Bilaterally, new embassies were opened, e.g. in Amman, Riyadh and Doha. Multilaterally, within the Euro-Atlantic structures Hungary faced new obligations and new opportunities. Within NATO Hungary joined AF South, and in the European Union has participated in European policies aiming at cooperation with the Arab countries. Among the international development and aid targets, one of Hungary's partners is the Palestinian National Authority (the Palestinian territories). Hungary as an EU member participates in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and its follow-up the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy.
      The European Union's policy towards the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean has undergone a great development since 1995, when the Barcelona Process was launched. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, a bilateral and multilateral structure, was complemented by and drawn under the umbrella of the European Neighbourhood Policy, a structure based on bilateral connections, with a conditionality introduced among the original three baskets of political, economic and cultural cooperation. Europe's normative role has been increasingly reflected in the emphasis on democratisation in the partner states. The Union for the Mediterranean, launched by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, was meant to be a separate framework, but ended up as a complement to the EMP, and was even fused with it. Yet it meant one step away from the "dictates" of the European Union, as they were perceived by most Arab states, providing instead very practical fields of cooperation and real mutual benefits. While the several-in fact too many-cooperation frameworks not only overlap, but provide an almost incomprehensible system of relations, the political push towards democratisation may have become softer, yet is still there.
      The Central European EU member states, who joined this complicated process at a later stage, had to adjust to the swiftly moving realities and demands. On the other hand, having just undergone a serious democratisation process of their own, it seemed obvious that this was a field where they could-and they were eager to-contribute and share their experience.
      Is it obvious, though?
      Central European states are not homogenous, but neither are Arab countries. Each one has a different past, and different practices. But while the Central Europeans have all opted for democracies, the Arab states may formally be republics or kingdoms, but most of them observe at least some degree of authoritarian character. Central Europeans have gone from one-party to multi-party systems, converted their armies and put them under civilian control, changed from centrally planned economies to liberal free markets, and guaranteed freedom of expression and freedom of the press. While many of these features are observed in Arab states as well, there is an underlying basic difference: the starting point. Central Europeans-as was already indicated-have almost all throughout their histories been parts of the European mainstream development, while the Arab states have followed an entirely different path of development, in which European ideals and institutions have always been foreign (alien) and enforced from the outside. This allows us to conclude that while there may be practical and technical experiences that may contribute to the process of democratisation in the Arab countries, on the whole they will have to find their own way.

The paper was presented at the conference "Twenty Years of Democratic Transition in Hungary and the Middle East" of the Arab Thought Forum, in Amman, Jordan, 17th December 2009.